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SENSITIVE
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DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS)

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [NPT](#) [CDG](#) [KNNP](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: NPT: GOJ SEES DISARMAMENT ON TRACK; ACADEMIC WARNS
OF FUTURE CHALLENGES

REF: A. STATE 83600
[1](#)B. TOKYO 981
[1](#)C. TOKYO 512
[1](#)D. STATE 06970

Classified By: Ambassador John V. Roos for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 21.

[1](#)2. (C) Summary: The Government of Japan wants a successful 2010 Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon), and believes the current momentum towards disarmament should help achieve a positive outcome, according to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official. While the GOJ has yet to define its specific goals for the RevCon, Japan's basic policy of seeking realistic steps towards disarmament is unlikely to change. According to the official, the change of government in Japan following the August 30 election will not affect disarmament policy since both major parties share common goals on the issue. The official believes a balance between disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy will be necessary to obtain a successful NPT outcome. MOFA hopes continued U.S.-Japan cooperation can help achieve this balance, and would welcome continued exchanges with the U.S. as we approach the RevCon.

[1](#)3. (C) One academic, speaking as an observer and member of the disarmament movement in Japan, concurred with the assessment that current progress should produce a positive RevCon outcome, but said the Democratic Party of Japan may push harder for disarmament in the future. He also warned the rise of nationalist elements in Japan could challenge Japan's future support for disarmament. End Summary.

NPT Policy within the GOJ

[1](#)4. (C) Achieving success at the 2010 RevCon is a top priority for Japan, but the GOJ has not yet settled on particular goals for the conference, according to MOFA Arms Control and Disarmament Director Shigeru Umetsu. Umetsu told Econoff in an August 27 meeting the GOJ is beginning bilateral consultations to discuss what outcomes can be achieved at the RevCon. Regardless of the specifics decided for the RevCon, Umetsu asserted Japan's basic approach to disarmament, i.e. taking realistic steps, will not change.

[1](#)5. (C) Umetsu noted the 13 Steps agreed in 2000 should be referenced at the upcoming RevCon, and suggested some of those steps will need to be updated. Specifically, Japan puts a high priority on the early entry into force of the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the commencement of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). These goals, he asserted, should be included in any agreement made at the RevCon. Additionally, taking into account developments between 2000 and the present, some new steps may be needed; Umetsu had no suggestions for what those should be. Finally, Umetsu highlighted the 11 benchmarks for disarmament proposed by Foreign Minister Nakasone in April (reported ref B), and said Japan would seek to include those at the RevCon. These benchmarks, Umetsu said, include all the measures for disarmament and nonproliferation upon which Japan places high importance.

¶6. (C) In addition to his 11 benchmarks, Nakasone also proposed that a conference on disarmament be held in Japan before the RevCon, with the hopes that the conference could contribute to a positive outcome for the RevCon. (Note: It is currently unclear how this proposal will be affected by the recent change in power in the GOJ. End note.)

¶7. (C) Umetsu noted MOFA formulates GOJ disarmament policy in consultation with other agencies like the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) on issues such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Within MOFA, his division, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division under Director Hideo Suzuki, has primary responsibility, and Director-General Toshio Sano of the Disarmament, Non-proliferation, and Science Department is the most senior official directly responsible for disarmament policy. MOFA Divisions responsible for the U.S.-Japan relationship also play a coordinating role.

Outside the government

¶8. (C) Asked about the importance of NGOs and academia, Umetsu noted that disarmament NGOs continue to be very active in Japan. MOFA, according to Umetsu, attaches importance to civil society outreach and thus tries to maintain close contact with the NGOs. These disarmament groups and others welcomed President Obama's speech in Prague, which has "intensified" their expectations of progress towards a nuclear free world. However, Umetsu noted "other segments" of the population remain cautious because Japan is "surrounded" by nuclear armed China and North Korea.

¶9. (C) Takao Takahara, Assistant Dean and Professor of International Politics and Peace Research at Meiji Gakuin University provided an slightly different perspective on disarmament issues in Japan. Takahara, a staunch advocate of peace and disarmament and a commentator on the NPT process, began his meeting with econoff by commenting that "we should close the U.S. nuclear umbrella, because it is no longer raining."

¶10. (C) Takahara agrees with MOFA that the President's Speech had heightened expectations, but expressed some reservation these may be too high in some circles. He cited as an example the Hiroshima 2020 campaign, which seeks a nuclear free world by 2020 and has gone as far as to invoke the President's name as part of its "Obamajority" slogan. Takahara admitted that 2020 was an unrealistic date for such a goal, and suggested instead that a convention outlawing nuclear weapons and creating a path to their abolition would be a more realistic target. High expectations aside, Takahara said he saw the increasing number and seriousness of proposals from Japanese NGOs as a positive sign that Japan's disarmament movement was strong and healthy.

¶11. (C) Asked about the ability of the NGOs to affect government policy, Takahara said they have done so in the past, but suggested future achievements will depend on the openness of the government. He cited as an example the third non-nuclear principle (of not permitting nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory), which he said was included as a result of public opinion. But he contrasted this with what he

suggested was the willingness by past governments to secretly violate the principle and permit nuclear weapons in Japan.

Comments on U.S.-Russia initiatives

¶12. (C) Umetsu said Japan welcomes USG initiatives with Russia to negotiate a successor treaty to START I. At the same time, Japan understands the conditions that make progress on this issue difficult. The GOJ hopes that whatever is achieved in this context before the end of the year can be presented to the international community in a way that is perceived as real progress.

¶13. (C) Japan's NGOs strongly welcome U.S.-Russian disarmament progress, according to Takahara. They had been concerned initially that the crisis in Georgia would derail U.S.-Russian progress. The general public, he suggested, pays attention to the efforts via the news, but is poorly informed on the specifics.

International Organizations

¶14. (C) Japan sees all International Organizations (IOs) as important, according to Umetsu. However, he singled out the International Monitoring System (IMS) as particularly important because the GOJ feels a reliable monitoring system will be necessary for the USG to persuade U.S. constituencies to accept the CTBT. He also acknowledged the election of Amano as Director General of the IAEA may increase Japan's focus on that organization.

¶15. (C) Regarding the UN, Japan intends to introduce its traditional yearly resolution on disarmament in the UN General Assembly First Committee. Umetsu said now that U.S. policy on CTBT has changed, the GOJ hopes the USG will be able to support the resolution this year.

¶16. (C) Professor Takahara agreed Japan places great importance on the use of IOs, which he suggested was the result of the post-war period in which Japan's international status was low, and needed to use the IOs to gain legitimacy. Takahara contrasted this with what he asserted was Japan's lack of direct international support for its goals, claiming that "Japan doesn't have good friends." He suggested that "as the U.S. declines," Japan will become simply one important country among many "oligarchs."

Japanese policy in the future

¶17. (C) Regarding the August 30 election in Japan, which swept the opposition DPJ into power for the first time in the party's history, Umetsu asserted that the basics of Japanese disarmament policy would not change. Because of the change in government, the GOJ may be unable to cite the "11 Benchmarks" proposed by Nakasone, but the use of those benchmarks as policy objectives likely will change little since they are supported by both the LDP and DPJ. (Note: Although econoff's meeting with Umetsu occurred shortly before the August 30 election, Umetsu spoke with the expectation of a DPJ victory. End note.)

¶18. (C) Takahara agreed both parties would support disarmament measures like the CTBT and FMCT, though he cautioned that average politicians are not well versed on the specifics of disarmament issues. Regarding DPJ Secretary General and now possible Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, Takahara noted Okada "doesn't like nukes" and suggested Okada would push hard for disarmament as well as for relying less on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Okada said publicly in July that if he became Foreign Minister, he would order the GOJ to release any documents related to a secret agreement between the U.S. and Japan to allow nuclear weapons to enter Japan.

The first step of a DPJ administration, Takahara suggested, would be to make a very clear statement of support for Japan's three non-nuclear principles. Renouncing the U.S. nuclear umbrella, he said, would be an unrealistic option for the party, given the situation in Asia.

¶19. (C) Takahara's main concern about the future of disarmament support in Japan was not immediate shifts in GOJ policy, but instead longer term threats to Japanese pacifism coming from increased nationalism and militarism. Takahara said he and his colleagues are seeing an increase in the numbers of outspoken "rightist students" in their classes. He cited nationalistic textbooks and political cartoons from Kobayashi Yoshinori as symptoms of, and contributors to, this trend. While Takahara admitted this was a longer term trend unlikely to affect the 2010 RevCon, he warned that rightist elements may challenge Japanese pacifism in the future. In his words, peaceful post-war nationalism is being threatened by traditional nationalism.

What the GOJ wants from the U.S.

¶20. (C) Umetsu noted that Japan understands that a balance between disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy is essential to success of the NPT system. He said MOFA hopes continued U.S.-Japan cooperation can help achieve this result, and would welcome continued exchanges with the U.S. as we approach the RevCon. He specifically requested information on the following topics:

- ¶A. How flexible is the U.S. on issues related to the DPRK, Iranian, and Syrian nuclear programs?
- ¶B. What is the U.S. position on a Middle East resolution?
- ¶C. What is the U.S. position on nuclear fuel assurances as it relates to NPT?
- ¶D. What is the U.S. position on the issue of NPT withdrawal?
- ¶E. Are there any redlines for the U.S. at the RevCon, and what issues are "bargainable"?

¶21. (SBU) Action request: Post would welcome any information on U.S. positions related to the 2010 RevCon, including the issues listed above, as well as information on the President's Nuclear Security Summit, to be shared with the GOJ.
ROOS